Axelrod, R., 2001. The evolution of cooperation. In M. E. Hellman, ed. Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking. Walker Publishing Company, Inc, pp. 185-193. Available at: http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/axelrod.pdf.This chapter is a revision of a different publication, but it's nice and concise. It goes through the results from a tournament where people programmed different strategies for the prisoner's dilemma game, and looks at what the indicators are for cooperation. I think the bit that is most useful/relevant to me is a quote about the length of time it takes for cooperative strategies to evolve. I think that would relate to the way we use the rules to suggest cooperative strategies are best.
(This could also hark back to why the Name of the Game paper saw such an effect - if cooperate with tit for tat is such a good strategy, suggesting that with the title would lead to people 'getting it' faster. Obviously that's pure speculation though...)